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To examine the role of mundane technologies in 
institutional change, we conduct an inductive 
longitudinal study of a translation in the field of UK 
grocery retailing and elucidate a process of bottom-up 
transformation, where customer data replaced 
product data as a key determinant in decision-making. 
Our analysis uncovers that such change develops over 
time through three phases: (1) triggering change 
through the costs of the technology, (2) capturing 
value through the benefits of the technology, and (3) 
retaining transformative momentum through the 
ability of the technology to develop. While illustrating 
the process, we show how mundane technologies do 
not take on new meaning as a result of their innate 
features but through their relationality in mutual 
constitution with the field. Hence our study illustrates 





During the past decade, the microfoundations of 
institutional change have been subject to active 
research [1] [2] [3]. This has been mainly due to the 
realization that the role of practices in the creation or 
change in fields is neither an exclusively top-down or 
bottom-up process, thus opening up new avenues to 
understand institutionalization [1] [3] [4] [5]. 
However, while the current micro-level approaches 
envisage certain individuals as having the ability to 
bring about institutional change, technologies, which 
are often the ‘tools’ for conducting the action, have 
mostly been viewed as non-transformational or even 
inert entities [2] [6]. Studies focusing on technology-
driven institutionalization have typically attributed 
change with the technological innovations [7] [8] and 
the introduction of new disruptive technologies [9] 
[10] [11], changing the way work is done. Locking-in 
to a certain pre-existent technology, on the other hand, 
has mainly been seen as a reason for organizational 
stagnation [6]. 
In the recent literature, there can be found 
indications that even mundane technologies may hold 
potential for bottom-up emergence [2] [12]. Especially 
practice scholars have been active in seeking to 
capture the interaction between human and non-
human actants in change [4]. Adopting a practice 
perspective has enabled institutional research to go 
beyond the deterministic approach to collective action, 
in which practices and technologies are seen as 
diffusing inert objects, being responsible for fulfilling 
an organization’s tasks, without having any 
transformative role [4] [12]. However, as the focus of 
this research has predominantly been on 
understanding the interaction of individual practices 
and technologies, there is a need to understand how 
these micro-level developments connect to field 
transformation. 
We attempt to shed light into this gap by studying 
the unfolding of a specific mundane technology driven 
transformation from a translational instead of a 
diffusion logic [15]. In our paper, we follow [16] and 
define a mundane technology as embedded within its 
environment, “being intertwined with the reproduction 
of the normal and the routinized”, embodying for 
example remote controls, automatic door closers, and 
calculators. In practical terms, we show how a data 
analytics feature of a loyalty program, built on a 
relatively simple algorithm, the Rolling Ball, started 
through cost-cuts in its operating environment to 
slowly create new insights into customer behavior for 
the grocery retailer Tesco, the currently largest 
grocery retailer in the UK. This action conducted by 
the algorithm hence illuminated the value of customer 
data to several decision-makers within the 
organization, leading to its more systematic collection 
and use. Very quickly, the use of customer data spread 
to a variety of functions within Tesco, and this data 
was eventually also shared with suppliers. Through 
various mechanisms, Tesco’s competitors began to 
implement similar processes, with the result that 
customer data became the primary determinant in 
decision-making for the entire industry. As a result, 
this customer-centric view can now be considered a 
new norm that is followed not only by most retailers 
but also by suppliers, whose operations are heavily 





informed and determined by the customer data 
collected by retailers. 
In our findings, we uncover that a change created 
and sustained by mundane technologies is a process 
that develops over time through three phases: (1) 
triggering change through the costs of the technology, 
(2) capturing value through the benefits of the 
technology and (3) retaining transformative 
momentum through the ability of the technology to 
develop. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
Several recent studies have focused on linking 
practice-based research with institutional theory to 
advance our understanding of individuals and their 
actions on institutional change [3] [17]. For example, 
Gawer and Phillips [17] identified different forms of 
institutional work at Intel, while it moved from a 
traditional supply chain logic dominated by computer 
assemblers to a new platform logic following very 
different organizing principles. The study uncovers the 
connection between various forms of institutional 
work and the subsequent shifts in field-level 
institutional logics. Similarly, Smets et al. [3], by 
means of their case study of a law firm, have shown 
that change may come about via reflexive attempts by 
individuals to solve problems in their mundane day-to-
day activities. Their study illustrates three different 
mechanisms through which mundane work became 
justified and diffused among lawyers in the field of 
law and legal services. These mechanisms are 
variously termed situated improvising, reorienting the 
normative network, and unobtrusive embedding, the 
latter referring to a change “radiating” beyond an 
organization in an effective or “unobtrusive” way to 
cause change at the field-level. More recently, e.g., 
Cardinale [18] and Haack et al. [1] have seen everyday 
mundane and routinized practices as drivers of 
institutional change; when practices evolve, 
institutions are seen to change. 
Another stream of literature has focused on 
understanding the link between technologies and 
practices. In this stream, for example Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury [19] have shown how practices can be 
considered as non-deterministic drivers of 
technological diffusion within fields. Subsequently, 
the paper suggests a shift in institutional theory from 
the “isomorphic world of diffusion” to viewing fields 
as sites of contestation. On the other hand, Labatut et 
al. [4] have seen the influence of technologies on 
practices as a combination of three dimensions 
(technical substrate, managerial philosophy and 
organizational model), hence furthering our 
understanding of change to the other direction – the 
role of technologies in the (re-)creation of practices. 
Overall, practice-based studies connecting human and 
non-human actants have emphasized the relative 
importance of materialism and agency in the process 
of change. The impact of technologies as non-human 
actants are seen to arise from their entanglement with 
actors through different socio-technical relations [12]. 
Although technologies are most commonly evaluated 
through their outputs and performances [13] [14], for 
example, Labatut et al. [4], see also references therein, 
have discussed that the nexus between the human and 
non-human is also created through various 
assumptions, rational myths, belief systems, and 
different institutional forces acting as vehicles for 
change. Moreover, payoffs and uncertainties related to 
the use of technologies are often seen as the most 
important dimension in their renewal decisions [9]. 
While the above links imply co-constitution 
among non-deterministic technologies and 
institutional fields, various adjacent literatures point to 
the same direction too. For example Foucault’s notion 
of governmentality in political research has been 
considered to be reflected on institutionalization 
processes [22]. He has argued that technologies are not 
mere artefacts disconnected from broader intentions, 
knowledge systems or rationalities – they are proposed 
to have roles in bottom-up emergence through the 
constitution of power and knowledge. We attempt to 
contribute to this gap in institutional theory by 
illustrating and analyzing a process of technology-
driven institutionalization.  
Following the practice path, which has proved 
insightful for the purpose as discussed above, we study 
the unfolding of the transformation from a 
translational instead of a diffusion logic focusing on 
micro-level developments that led to changes [15]. In 
the translation literature, practices and technologies 
are seen to be transformed as they become embedded 
in new organizational environments, being then 
further transferred to entirely new fields where given 
a different meaning [23] [24]. While a diffusion logic 
considers transformation processes as relatively linear 
and often sees technologies as deterministic, a 
translation approach assumes that novelty and the 
power of technologies arises through a complex 
network of relations between actors and their outputs 
and, hence, in-the-making [23]. For example Pallas et 
al. [24] in their study focusing on a translation process, 
highlight the importance of understanding the 
translated entities as loosely coupled systems, with the 
distinct elements producing very context specific 
outcomes. The same phenomenon can be seen in the 
afore described connections between human and non-
human actants [4] [9]. Overall, a translational 
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perspective assumes that changes cannot be explained 
by macro-level approaches only as they predominantly 
focus on organizations and their relationship [25]. All 
of this indicates that even the most mundane 
technologies may possess transformative capacities 
when taken to different organizational environments. 
Hence we ask the research question, how does a 
mundane technology-driven institutional change 
unfold in practice? 
 
3. Methods and data 
 
We adopt an inductive theory-building approach 
in our study on the role of mundane technologies in  an 
institutional transformation process [26] [27]. As we 
are interested in understanding the relationship 
between micro- and macro-level dynamics, we take a 
practice perspective focusing on everyday activities 
and their consequences across different levels. 
Accordingly, our study requires close-up engagement 
with practitioners as well as knowledge of the broader 
context and network of the focal organization 
throughout the time under investigation [28]. 
 
3.1. Research setting 
 
The case of UK food retailing provides a 
particularly interesting empirical setting, as it can be 
considered the frontrunner in a global transformation, 
where customer data increasingly replaced point-of-
sales (POS) data in most retail functions. The UK 
retailers were the first to embrace the change in 
operational principles and can today be considered as 
a space where the decision-making processes of most 
companies have, to a certain extent, become embedded 
in customer data analyses. As a result, the focus of 
grocery retailers and suppliers has seen a field-level 
shift from products to customers, with different loyalty 
programs operating as vehicles for change. 
The transformation was initiated years after Tesco 
launched its Clubcard in 1995 [29] [30] [31]. The 
introduction of the program, which by no means was 
intended to be transformative, arguably later provided 
Tesco with a valuable edge that was instrumental in 
steering the company into profitable new business 
areas, forcing the other retailers to follow suit. After 
an exploratory phase, during which the mundane 
algorithm under study was routinely applied for 
calculating discounts and customizing vouchers, the 
focus slowly shifted to its exploitation, not only by the 
retailer but throughout the supply chain [30] [31]. 
Finally, many of the data analyses became automated 
and were thus embedded as drivers of change within 
the organizations. Currently, customer behavior is 
seen as the key driver of development, with data being 
automatically collected and analyzed at every touch 
point (store, app, website, contact center, email, and 
social media) in ever increasing volumes. 
 
3.2. Data and analysis 
 
Due to the longitudinal nature of the research 
study, it relies on a large amount of data derived 
documented in the archives of our case companies, 
which are combined with data collected from a variety 
of public sources. Archival data is particularly suitable 
for longitudinal process studies where the past 
development of an entity is being observed over a long 
period of time [28]. After analyzing voluminous 
written documents, chronologies have been 
constructed of the past developments. The archive 
material was complemented by a number of meetings 
and informal discussions, during which the collected 
and documented data were repeatedly consulted.  
In addition to the meetings and documents that 
provided us with evidence on what was happening in 
the field at that time, we conducted interviews for 
evidence of the sensemaking in retrospect. In choosing 
the interviewees, we particularly focused on 
informants who have been closely involved in the 
introduction of the use of customer data and its impact 
on the customer offer. We have striven for maximum 
accuracy and legitimacy [26] by comparing the 
individual interviews. In cases of contradiction, 
respondents have been contacted for further 
clarification. 
Meetings. We attended a total of 108 
management meetings between years 1993 and 2016. 
During and in preparation of those meetings, we were 
often asked for our own observations and insights on 
the process. Multiple times, we followed up on 
particular details with people who participated in the 
meetings. These debriefings provided very valuable 
insights into to how people felt about the content of the 
meeting and the decisions made. Further, being on site 
also allowed us the opportunity to observe employees 
carrying out their daily tasks. A particular focus of 
these interactions was in our encouragement of 
employees to enlighten us on the activities involved in 
carrying out their role, and asking them to explain how 
they had adapted their practices in the light of the 
customer data that had become available. This 
produced many confidential (and often commercially 
sensitive) notes, as well as some publicly available 
case studies that turned into documents for our study. 
Documents. We had access to various internal 
company documentations regarding the use of 
customer data. Other publicly available documents 
included annual reports, news articles, magazine 
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interviews, and books, including Scoring Points by 
Clive Humby, Terry Hunt and Tim Phillips (2008). 
Documentation from a variety of sources was analyzed 
throughout the whole time period from 1990 to 2018, 
which started before the industry had made any 
attempts to collect and use customer data. 
Interviews. Between 2014-2019, we conducted 
19 interviews that focused on the role of data analytics 
technologies and its role in creating customer data. 
Focusing our research on specific practices, we 
designed a list of semi-structured interview questions 
that were used throughout the interviews. We 
prompted interviewees to reflect on the changing role 
of customer data in everyday operations, how its use 
had changed the daily practices, how the data 
challenged the established ways of working, and how 
all of this affected other organizations and customers. 
The interviewees were asked to provide their views on 
the phases of change through which the field and 
individual organizations passed, and to explain cause-
and-effect relationships related to these changes. We 
compared the interviews with secondary data, such as 
archival documents, and in cases of contradiction or 
vagueness we asked the interviewees for further 
clarification. As a result, a consistent picture emerged 
and eventually there were no major contradictions. We 
ended the process when new insights no longer 
emerged, and the saturation of our particular focus 
could be considered as having been achieved. 
The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 
hours and resulted in approximately 17 hours of 
interview material. All interviews were transcribed 
verbatim. The interviews provided a consistent picture 
and no major contradictions arose. We stopped the 
process after 19 interviews when no new insights 
emerged and we considered saturation of our 
particular focus to be achieved. In an iterative process 
during which both authors were involved, we analyzed 
and coded the interviews individually and cross-
checked our readings, going back and forth between 
theoretical concepts and empirical data. Based on our 
analysis, we were able to divide the past development 
into three phases that resulted to translation. Our data 
does not represent a realist account but rather an 
inductive narrative based on how managers and senior 





We will next present how the retailing industry 
has gone through a transformation over the last 25 
years and since the introduction of a systematic 
collection of customer data. Along the lines of the 
different phases of this transformation process, we 
focus on how people narrate and interpret the impact 
of algorithmic technologies and its journey in 
transforming the organizing of retailing. While doing 
this, we uncover that a change created by mundane 
technologies is a process that evolves over time 
through a sequence of three phases: (1) triggering 
change through the costs of the technology, (2) 
capturing value through the benefits of the technology 
and (3) retaining its transformative momentum 
through the ability of the technology to develop. All of 
this can, finally, results to a field-level change, where 
the entire operating logic in grocery retailing has been 
transformed. 
 
4.1. Phase 1 – Introducing customer data 
 
“Typically, a branch manager would sit down and 
have a monthly meeting or whatever with their boss, 
the Regional Head of Operations. They would look at 
the P&L, they’d talk about sales, they’d talk about 
wastage, they’d talk about pay, which are the kind of 
elements on the profit and loss account [...] but never 
about customers, unless you count sales as a customer 
measure.” (L) 
Until the early 1990s, Tesco, like the other 
grocery retailers in the UK, collected and relied on 
point-of-sales (POS-) data but in 1994 Tesco began a 
collaboration with a small data analysis company 
called Dunnhumby to launch a loyalty program known 
as the Clubcard. The plan was to enhance customer 
loyalty in the increasingly competitive grocery 
retailing market. Based on their experience from an 
American software business (software engineering), 
the founders of Dunnhumby were able to “show the 
Tesco board that their tiny business had the software 
and skills to do something the supermarket group 
hadn't been able to do for itself - work out almost 
exactly what Tesco's customers were buying.”  This 
allowed a feature for the program for the collection 
and analysis of customer data, which enabled Tesco to 
provide customized offers upon that was vastly more 
detailed than that offered by POS-data. 
When the loyalty program was first launched, 
customers could sign up for their Clubcard at one of 
Tesco’s stores. They were required to provide their 
names and addresses, as well as information on their 
age, the size of their families, etc. Such information 
would allow Tesco to identify which customer had 
made each transaction performed at one of its stores. 
“If you go into a store and you buy an average number 
of items, say 20 items, from the Tesco's on Cowley 
Road and if you bought 20 items with your Clubcard 
or even without your Clubcard, you would generate 21 
lines of data. There's one line of data that says [John] 
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went in at 12:30 on a Wednesday and he paid cash. 
Then there's one line of data for each of the 20 items I 
bought that says it’s Cheerios, 300 grams, and I paid 
£1.99.” (F) 
By making purchases at Tesco, customers would 
accumulate points that were converted into targeted 
discount vouchers that Tesco would mail to the 
customers several times each year. When paying at the 
till, not only would the products purchased by a 
customer be swiped, the customer’s Clubcard and any 
of the discount coupons they were using would also be 
registered. To operate the analytics feature of the 
process, Dunnhumby introduced an algorithm called 
the Rolling Ball for customizing the offer. 
“We use an algorithm, called the Rolling Ball, 
which draws links and common patterns between 
different products. For example Alphabetti Spaghetti 
would class as a ‘family’ product. By knowing that it 
often appears in a basket alongside a breakfast cereal 
like Coco Pops, Dunnhumby would assign a stronger 
‘family rating’ to Coco Pops.” [29] 
The customer data processing initially amounted 
to a rather simple algorithmic process designed to 
increase loyalty. The automated process of Tesco 
applied the gathered information to provide more 
customized discount coupons and hence to serve 
customers better. As explained by Hayward [29], 
“Thanks to the Rolling Ball algorithm, a unique DNA 
profile for each Tesco shopper was created”. The 
process was operated alongside but separate from 
Tesco’s other processes such new product 
development, pricing and design of promotions. 
For the first years, the algorithm was nothing 
more than an automated process recording customer 
transactions, calculating individual purchases and 
assigning customized vouchers accordingly [30]. Due 
to the high maintenance expenses of running the 
analyses and the simultaneous need to cut costs in 
Tesco, there was an internal pressure to terminate the 
program or alternatively find more ways to utilize the 
accessible data. According to one interviewee, the 
investment became heavy “when falling grocery 
prices have squeezed margins on [Tesco’s] core 
business.”  
“The cost of rebate is only one overhead of a 
loyalty programme…there are the costs of managing a 
programme  – investment in systems, fulfilment 
support, and so forth…many retailers seriously 
underestimate the full costs of setting up and 
sustaining loyalty programmes (which were at the time 
£300 million/year).” [30] The ability to send slightly 
more customized coupons (to initially 4 different 
customer segments) instead of sending alternating 
vouchers (to provide occasional offers for every 
customer), did not seem worth continuing the 
investment from the shareholders perspective. At the 
time it seemed likely that the Clubcard program would 
need to have continued forward with lowered 
dividends and without the data-analytics feature, with 
coupons being sent but not customized [30]. The 
increased internal pressure on Tesco’s senior 
management sparked research to look for other 
potential uses of customer data. 
As a result, “we [Dunnhumby] started working 
with the commercial teams in Tesco to think about 
where customer data could speed up or improve 
things.” (C) The ultimate goal was to figure out 
whether there were potential uses for customer data in 
the commercial teams. “We had an R&D sort of team 
that were looking at the things that were 
interesting…We basically had a monthly presentation 
to Richard, Tim and Terry [Tesco’s senior 
management]…these are the things we are finding… 
and we think you should put more effort behind this 
one and this on. And then, they normally form a 
project team to support that.” (C) With new research, 
the use of customer data slowly advanced. First it 
proved useful in informing new product development 
since it provided the first opportunity to observe 
whether the same customers would buy a new product 
for a second time, thereby more accurately indicating 
whether a new product was going to be a success. 
“This was obviously something that traditional 
product sales data was unable to do” (F). Customer 
data was later also relevant to the area of pricing. 
Through this data, Tesco realized its customer-base 
consisted of several distinct groups, some of which 
were highly price sensitive while others were not. 
Thus, Tesco could start to adjust the pricing of its 
products in a more flexible and efficient way. “For 
example, contrary to the traditional pricing method of 
lowering prices on some of the biggest-selling items in 
order to attract more customers, Tesco could now 
focus on the products that were popular among price-
conscious shoppers.” (C) A similar development took 
place in promotions, which could likewise be 
efficiently targeted at specific customer groups. 
“Retailers at the time obviously knew how much 
they were selling of a particular product, but the key 
point is that they did not know what combination of 
items consumers were typically buying. Dunnhumby 
was able to provide this information.” 
The new advances in the use of data enabled 
Tesco to “double its market share in little more than a 
year, to overtake Sainsbury's and become the UK's 
largest retailer, and transform the way many of us 
shop.” As a result, competing companies followed 
Tesco in their initiative, with different programs being 
launched in the UK as well as globally. Due to rapidly 
developing computing power, retailers gained access 
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to larger amounts of data and a pool of customer 
information that was unavailable until quite recently. 
One of our interviewees who worked at Tesco back in 
the 1990s explained that “computers back then could 
only process 0.5% of the barcode level data.” (F) 
In our analysis we concluded that the 
transformation of the field of UK grocery retailing was 
not primarily initiated by any external factor, even 
though technological development had a part to play. 
Instead, the decisions to implement customer data 
analytics and to later utilize the results were taken by 
Tesco’s management. The studied technology was an 
algorithm that initially provided a mundane and 
mechanical process for the customizations of offers to 
Tesco’s 4 customer segments based on past shopping 
transactions. However, the running costs of the 
algorithm became too significant during Tesco’s price 
cuts, and this sparked the drive to gain more strategic 
and operational benefits for the resulting customer 
data by using it to inform the design and offer in 
Tesco’s stores. Before the cost cuts at Tesco, the 
rolling ball algorithms was highly institutionalized and 
incapable of producing an output beyond “normal or 
routinized”, making it seem evident that its 
transformative impact was triggered by the way it 
relates to relevant actants. Without the high running 
costs, its operation would have remained unnoticed by 
the senior management in the large organization of 
Tesco. 
Hence we argue that the cost of running a 
mundane technology is often the first trigger in its 
transformative impact. 
 
4.2 Phase 2 – Working with customer data 
 
The increasing computational power gave 
retailers further abilities to better understand detailed 
customer data and make connections between events 
and activities that were not noticeable before. Thanks 
to the ability to collect a larger amount of more 
specific data, “retailers began to develop customer 
segmentation models”, that is, categories of customers 
based on geographic and demographic data. I 
As the field of data analysis further evolved, they 
added behavior variables to this categorization and 
enabled the move from 4 to 27 different customer 
segments, providing an even deeper understanding of 
customer needs. Overall, customer segmentation 
models slowly developed to help retailers divide 
customers more accurately based on their needs and 
preferences. This was no more only for the purposes 
of providing customizing, but now most importantly 
for developing the in-store offering. As explained by 
one of our interviewees, “we have found through our 
work with our retailer partners that the impact of retail 
decision support is 5-10 times more significant to the 
business than 1-1 communication.” (A) 
Today’s technologies allow for even more 
detailed understanding of customers’ needs and 
behaviors, which allows retailers to provide even more 
customized services. As one interviewee said: “The 
biggest change that came about with the growth of data 
[…], is that you’re now able to much more effectively 
connect their behaviors and attitudes.” (D)  
Hence, over time, the use of customer data had a 
more and more profound influence on most of Tesco’s 
processes and operations, and this eventually 
amounted to organizational transformation, where the 
focus of analyses slowly shifted from products to 
customers.  
In the next phase of the development, the 
transformation spread to the suppliers. As emphasized 
by one of our interviewees, “while the available 
information on customers is definitely useful for the 
retailers as such, it becomes even more powerful when 
used by the various actors throughout the supply 
chain.” (G) 
The sharing of customer data and analyses with 
supply chain partners was pioneered in the UK, indeed 
perhaps globally, by Tesco. As time went on, Tesco’s 
suppliers became interested in the data Tesco had 
collected about their customers. The moment when 
retailers started sharing the data with their supply 
chain marked a real turning point. This changed the 
entire relationship between retailers and suppliers 
which, through history, was based on the same 
question - how cheaply can a supplier provide a 
product to the retailer.  
As one interview put it:  “I think what some of the 
pioneers in this area realized was that, despite the fact 
that they're always going to negotiate on price, there 
was actually benefit in working together because at the 
end of the day, it was a combination of the efforts that 
delivered the customer experience.” (M)  
It was in 2002 when Tesco allowed their data 
analytics company Dunnhumby to provide 
anonymous access to their data to FMCG (Fast-
Moving-Consumer-Good) companies. “This brought 
Tesco much closer to suppliers such as Mars, Heinz, 
Unilever, Protect & Gamble, and others.” (F) 
Moreover, this move helped Tesco better understand 
their data insights and how they relate to their 
relationship with the suppliers. Suppliers were willing 
to pay Tesco for the customer data, which proved to be 
far superior to the data and analyses that suppliers had 
formerly used when developing new products or 
creating promotional campaigns. Moreover, a 
significant benefit came from the fact that “the retailer 
and supplier could now speak the same language when 
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discussing customer segments, sales performance 
metrics, etc. (M) 
It was apparent that sharing data and insights had 
a great impact on how retailers and suppliers worked 
together on new product development and assortment. 
For instance, each time a customer purchased an item, 
a data stream was created to inform the suppliers of the 
change in the system. With that level of data sharing 
set in place, the suppliers were able to organize the 
production more precisely and thus enhance the entire 
supply chain while allowing retailers to make 
continuous sales. 
After asking some of our interviewees to describe 
the use of these data streams and how the whole 
system worked in practice, we learned that also 
Sainsbury’s had adopted the Tesco model, and now all 
their suppliers have access to customer behavioral 
data. “So we said to Sainsbury’s, listen, you are not, 
well you are not maximizing the use of the data. Why 
not we set up for you a company that can do for 
Sainsbury’s what Dunnhumby does for Tesco.” (K) 
The suppliers do, however, have to pay to get access 
to data although the benefits of the shared analysis are 
mutual. The joint interpretation of the same metrics 
allows retailers and suppliers to discuss their 
objectives more accurately. The result of such shared 
efforts are mutual and they include the increase of 
sales and better customer satisfaction. 
As an example, one interviewee mentioned the 
retailers’ focus on promotions that led to substitution 
behavior among the customers. For example, if the 
retailer creates a special offer for Coke, they will sell 
more Coke but less Pepsi. “The customers might 
purchase more Coke under the influence of the deal 
but, in reality, the retailer will still be selling the same 
amount of stuff because their Pepsi sales would drop.” 
(B) In regards to this, the retailers are encouraging 
their suppliers to fund and design promotions in a way 
that will increase the sales of an entire category of 
products, not only specific products. 
Overall, we concluded that even as the change 
brought about by the Rolling Ball algorithm evolved 
into an industry-level change, this occurred 
incrementally rather than at a specific moment. As a 
result of internal pressure, Tesco and Dunnhumby 
gradually learned more about the analysis of customer 
data and developed its use, which first impacted on 
Tesco’s processes and this led to change at 
organization-level. We see here how the role and 
relations of a technology can lead the processes 
participants to ask new questions and update the 
intentions that are related not only to that particular 
process (such as the analytics feature of the loyalty 
program) but also to other processes (such as e.g. NPD 
and pricing). 
Later these changes also impacted the competitors 
and suppliers. Indeed, our findings suggest that the 
ability of a mundane technology to take higher-level 
transformation further depends on its ability to impact 
other processes. The other processes may be closely-
related within an organization; thus, within Tesco, the 
customer data largely replaced the point-of-sales data 
that had previously been used to inform pricing, 
promotions, etc. On a theoretical level, it is interesting 
to note that these latter processes were not 
exogenously recreated but simply became more 
effective when they were running based on customer 
data instead of point-of-sales data. They therefore 
carried the impact to the extent that change also 
occurred across organizational boundaries. For 
example, competing companies (e.g. Sainsbury’s) 
observed the advantages of using customer data and 
introduced analogous programs of their own. If other 
uses for the data would not have been found, the 
analytics feature of the program would have been 
terminated. 
Hence we argue that after gaining new 
momentum and increased scale, the benefits of a 
mundane technology is the catalyst for its further 
transformative impact. 
 
4.3. Phase 3 – Customer data-driven decision-
making 
 
Our discussions with the interviewees revealed 
the most recent advance in the use of data – the 
automation of data collection and analysis. It was 
determined that the longer a retailer worked with 
customer data, the more automated the entire process 
became. We also looked into the potential future of 
data usage in this sense and one of our interviewees 
mentioned that data-related services will be mainly 
embedded in algorithms. 
For the 90’s, it was the computing power that 
limited the advances of the customer data use. “Then 
it was not until about 2003 that we were able to look 
at 100% of the data.” (C) From that day until today, 
the computing power enabled the Rolling Ball 
algorithm to look into all shopping transactions. “That 
obviously had an impact. Then for several years we 
were on top of things because our computer could 
handle all the data.” (F) As no transactions were 
missed, it was for the first time possible to for example 
assess the impact of a specific advert on an individual 
customer in a reliable way. Through these advances, it 
was possible to take the tailoring and customization of 
offers to an entirely new level. Obviously, such 
tailoring of offers in real time requires a huge amount 
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of continuous decisions and hence automated 
decision-making. “So we need to set up to be able to 
get the data to do that but then also have the data 
science, the machine learning algorithms and the 
whole setup to be able to deliver on that in the blink of 
an eye.” (F) 
Our interviewees addressed that customer-centric 
algorithms are in fact the most reliable source when it 
comes to making customer-based decisions. In 
essence, a data algorithm is a much better foundation 
for future decisions than a random store manager’s 
“creative idea or gut feeling.” (L) Furthermore, real 
time data plays an enormous role in the whole process 
because it keeps the methods and decisions efficient 
within current situations. Human agency is no longer 
the best way to provide real time data. The reason 
behind this is that “businesses need to have full 
oversight over materials at every step of the supply 
chain in order for it to function effectively.” (M) This 
can only be achieved with automated data collection 
algorithms that allow businesses to quickly and 
precisely determine product locations in real time. 
Online shopping can serve as a great example 
here. Statistics show that people are likely to add 
additional items to their shopping list until the actual 
day of delivery. In a traditional setting, a customer 
who brings a list to a physical store is more likely to 
make additional off-list purchases than someone who 
is shopping online.  
Obviously, retailers are looking for ways to 
encourage their online shoppers to make additional 
purchases as well. This can be done with the help of 
algorithms that push notifications to remind online 
shoppers not to forget items on their list or to provide 
them with examples of similar products they might be 
interested in.  
As one interviewee explained it: “What we did 
was we analyzed people who would made a big 
purchase online, and then within the next couple of 
days had been into a store to buy just one or two items 
with the idea that this would be an indication of the 
types of products that people might have forgotten.” 
(F) 
The overall goal is to create a unique and 
convenient shopping experience for the customer, 
which includes benefits of both physical and online 
shopping. Tesco has already set up their own service 
to push this goal and, even though the realization of 
this idea is still in its early stages, the service is 
creating revenues although it is completely based on 
algorithms. Another example of using analytic models 
in retail stores is the fact that many retailers use 
weather data to stock their shelves. With insight to data 
such as the history of customer behavior and expected 
temperatures, businesses can predict what people in 
certain regions or areas would like to purchase.  
Whereas the analyzed Rolling Ball algorithm 
initially provided insights by looking at 0.5% of the 
barcode level data, the computing power now allows 
all transactional data to be analyzed, enabling further 
competitive advantage through wider and more 
accurate real time applications. This has amounted to 
a fundamental shift in the overall logic of decision-
making in the field of retailing; a shift that is now 
followed by most retailers and suppliers. Hence our 
findings illustrate, not only can customers’ actions be 
considered a central factor in what becomes offered in 
stores, but customer behavior and the retailers’ 
reactions to it have become so embedded in the 
advanced data analysis process that these may no 
longer be visible to managers. The technological 
developments have thus facilitated the functioning of 
the Rolling Ball algorithm, shifting power and agency 
to customers, who are effectively no longer mere 
customers but also co-producers and co-suppliers now 
participating and  sharing responsibility for production 
and supply decisions. 
Finally, to sustain its momentum, we argue that 
the technology needs to be able to develop, in order to 
continue providing value in the evolving environment. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
  
Our findings suggest that whether a mundane 
technology becomes a trigger depends on its role and 
relations with the surrounding environment. In reality, 
when Tesco first launched the Clubcard and the 
Rolling Ball algorithm was introduced, there were a 
lot of unknown aspects surrounding it and its 
operations produced significant costs for years. 
Further, its transformational power was not known a 
priori. The overall process was originally intended to 
reward Tesco’s customers based on what they bought 
and to gather information on their shopping behavior 
to offer targeted discounts and to hence increase 
loyalty. However, as the use of customer data 
intensified, it started to provide Tesco with insights 
that no-one else had at the time. During the time when 
other UK grocery retailers were not yet actively 
analyzing customer data, Tesco’s view of the world 
was quite different to that of its competitors. Most 
importantly, Tesco’s ability to not only understand and 
communicate with individual customer segments but 
also to influence their shopping habits set it apart from 
other grocery retailers. 
The main contribution arising from our findings 
is that mundane algorithms can result in a field-level 
transformation. We discuss this contribution to the 
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literature via the following three topics: (1) We discuss 
how mundane technologies can drive field-level 
changes, (2) we theorize the studied transformation 
process as translation, and (3) we discuss future 
research in the light of our findings. 
 
5.1 Technologies as drivers of field-level 
transformation processes 
 
We contribute to the current understandings of 
technology-driven transformation processes. As 
discussed in the background literature, technology-
driven field-level change has typically been attributed 
to the introduction of technological innovations [7] [8] 
or novel disruptive technologies [9] [10] [11]. On the 
other hand, “locking-in” to a certain pre-existent 
technology has been considered to result in 
organizational stagnation [6]. Our case study 
complements these understandings by illustrating a 
transformation process that is driven by a mundane 
pre-existent technology. 
The transformation process was initiated by the 
costs of the analyzed Rolling Ball algorithm in the 
changing environment of Tesco. However, the role of 
costs in not a new aspect to technology initiated 
transformations. Whereas we have witnessed the costs 
related to the use of the technology as the driver for 
change, past research has had an opposite view. For 
example Christensen [9] has related the tendency of 
sticking with existing technologies to maximizing 
profits by keeping the status quo. They have 
considered that devoting resources to new 
technologies increases uncertainties and costs. 
Whereas our study confirms costs as an important 
socio-technical dimension related to decisions 
regarding technologies, we contribute to the 
understanding by showing that technology associated 
costs can also lead towards transformation while the 
technology is used. Hence our results imply that 
management should not only consider costs as a 
burden in investment decisions, but also as drivers of 
the technologies further impact. 
The costs acted as a trigger for the change process 
at Tesco. For the transformation to advance, the 
algorithm had to fulfill its new role in Tesco’s 
marketing processes (e.g. pricing, promotions, NPD), 
as well as to match with the requirements of the 
changing technological environment. This is in line 
with the current understandings technology- and data-
driven change. For example Etzion and Aragon-
Correa [20] show how data analytics reinforce 
organizational sustainability and how different 
operational, strategic, and corporate activities are 
affected in this process. Moreover, and McAfee, and 
Brynjolfsson [21] discuss how Big Data can directly 
translate into improved decision making and 
organizational performance. As the computing power 
advanced, the Rolling Ball provided more detailed 
insights and stayed thus in par with the development. 
Overall, our study highlights the transformative 
power of mundane technologies in change processes. 
We have illustrated how mundane technologies do not 
only take on meaning as a result of their innate 
transformative features but through the relationality of 
mutual constitution over the transformation process  
[2] [32]. Through changes in the environment, we 
argue that all the numerous technologies we have 
embedded in our organizations hold potential for 
transformation. 
 
5.2. Interdependence of technologies within and 
across organizations 
 
We theorize the studied transformation process as 
translation. Following the translation logic, the 
running costs of the algorithm became too substantial 
while embedded in the operations of Tesco where 
margins were simultaneously squeezed, hence given a 
new meaning, and further transferring into a wider 
field-level transformation [7] [23] [24]. This sheds 
light on the relatively unexplored question of how 
mundane technologies can bring about higher-order or 
institutional change and points to the fact that each 
technology holds potential for generativity. Unlike 
previously studied practice-driven processes of 
institutional work, institutional entrepreneurship [33] 
or practice theory [3], where action leading to the 
creation, or alternatively transformation, of 
institutions is driven by human consideration by either 
intentionality or reflexivity, the change in our case was 
not purposeful, but triggered by the existence of a 
mundane and initially separate algorithm. 
Furthermore, while technology-driven transformation 
processes have typically been seen linear and 
technologies considered as deterministic [7], our 
translation approach views that the transformative 
power of mundane technologies arises through a 
complex network of relations between actors and their 
outputs, similarly as any other human led 
transformation [3] [2] [23] [24]. Our study underlines 
this relational nature of technologies. For example, 
Tesco’s pricing routine affected its sales operations, 
which then affected Tesco’s range routine while also 
affecting customer routines. 
Taking such a relational perspective is useful 
because it does not focus on the aggregation of 
technologies in the sense of a mere accumulation of 
stable entities. Instead, it acknowledges that as 
technologies are used, they interact with surrounding 
actants, creating generative forces [32]. Our empirical 
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findings support this conceptual shift, which is less 
concerned with bringing together the “right” 
technologies to fulfill a task and more to do with how 
these technologies and their outcomes feed into each 
other, potentially leading to changes within an 
organization or, as we have seen in our case, even the 




[1] Haack, P., J. Sieweke, L. Wessel. 2019. 
Microfoundations and Multi-Level Research on 
Institutions, Emerald Publishing Limited. 
[2] Powell, W.W., C. Rerup. 2016. Opening the Black Box: 
The Microfoundations of Institutions, In Greenwood et al. 
(Eds), The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism 2nd Edition. London: Sage. 
[3] Smets, M., T. Morris, R. Greenwood. 2012. From 
Practice to Field: A Multilevel Model of Practice-Driven 
Institutional Change. Academy of Management Journal, 
55: 877-904. 
[4] Labatut, J., F. Aggeri., N. Girard. 2012. Discipline and 
Change: How Technologies and Organizational Routines 
Interact in New Practice Creation. Organization Studies, 
33(1): 39-69. 
[5] Scott, R.W. 2008. Institutions and Organizations: Ideas 
and interests, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
[6] Patala, S., I. Korpivaara, A. Jalkala, A. Kuitunen, B. 
Soppe. 2019. Legitimacy Under Institutional Change: 
How incumbents appropriate clean rhetoric for dirty 
technologies. Organization Studies, 40(3): 395-419.  
[7] Garud, R., P.R. Nayyar, Z.B. Shapira. 1997. 
Technological Innovation: Oversights and Foresights. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[8] Schilling, M.A., R. Shankar. 2019. Strategic 
management of technological innovation. McGraw-Hill 
Education, New York. 
[9] Christensen, C. 1997. The Innovator’s Dilemma: When 
New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
[10] Kostoff, R.N., R. Boylan, G.R. Simons. 2004. 
Disruptive technology roadmaps. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 71(1-2): 141-159. 
[11] Kumaraswamy, A., R. Garud, S. Ansari. 2018. 
Perspectives on Disruptive Innovations. Journal of 
Management Studies, 55(7): 1025-1042. 
[12] Glaser, V.L., R. Valadao, T.R. Hannigan. 2021 
(forthcoming). Algorithms and routine dynamics. In 
D’Adderio, L., K. Dittrich, M.S. Feldman, B. Pentland, C. 
Rerup, D. Seidl. (Eds.) Cambridge Handbook of Routine 
Dynamics, Cambridge, UK. 
[13] Paavola, L., R. Cuthbertson. 2021. Algorithms creating 
paradoxes of power: Explore, exploit, embed, embalm. 
Information Systems Management. DOI: 
10.1080/10580530.2021.1939200. 
[14] Paavola, L., R. Cuthbertson. 2018. Routines as drivers 
of adaptation, incremental change and transformation. 
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2018(1), 15686. 
[15] Callon, M. 1986. Some elements of sociology of 
translation: Domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St. Brieux Bay. In J. Law (Ed.), Power, 
Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?: 196-
233. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
[16] Michael, M. 2003. Between the Mundane and the 
Exotic: Time for a different sociotechnical stuff. Time & 
Society, 12(1): 127-143. 
[17] Gawer, A., N. Phillips. 2013. Institutional Work as 
Logics Shift: The Case of Intel’s Transformation to 
Platform Leader. Organization Studies, 34(8): 1035-1071. 
[18] Cardinale, I. 2018. Beyond Constraining and Enabling: 
Toward New Microfoundations for Institutional Theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 43: 132-155. 
[19] Schneiberg, M., M. Lounsbury. 2008. Social 
movements and institutional analysis. In R. Greenwood, 
C. Oliver, K. Sahlin and R. Suddaby. The Sage Handbook 
of Organizational Institutionalism, Sage Publications Ltd, 
650–672. 
[20] Etzion, D., J.A. Aragon-Correa. 2016. Big Data, 
management, and sustainability: Strategic opportunities 
ahead. Organization & Environment, 29(2), 147-155. 
[21] McAfee, A., E. Brynjolfsson. 2012. Big data: The 
management revolution. Harvard Business Review, 
90(10), 60-66. 
[22] Lemke, T. 2001. 'The birth of bio-politics': Michel 
Foucault's lecture at the Collège de France on neo-liberal 
governmentality. Economy and Society, 30(2): 190-207. 
[23] Czarniawska, B., G. Sevon. 1996. Translating 
Organizational Change. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co. 
[24] Pallas, J., M. Fredriksson, L. Wedlin. 2016. Translating 
Institutional Logics: When the Media Logic Meets 
Professions. Organization Studies, 37(11): 1661-1684. 
[25] Cozzolino, A., G. Verona, F.T. Rothaermel. 2018. 
Unpacking the disruption process: New technology, 
business models, and incumbent adaptation. Journal of 
Management Studies, 55(7): 1166-1202. 
[26] Eisenhardt, K.M., M.E. Graebner. 2007. Theory 
building from cases: Opportunities and Challenges. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50: 25-32. 
[27] Strauss, A. L., J. M. Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative 
Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 
Grounded Theory, 2nd ed. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
[28] Langley, A. 1999. Strategies for theorizing from 
process data. Academy of Management Review, 24: 691-
710. 
[29] Hayward, M. 2009. Any colour you like as long as it’s 
any colour you like. dunnhumby, London. 
[30] Humby, C., T. Hunt, T.T. Phillips. 2008. Scoring 
Points: How Tesco Continues to Win Customer Loyalty. 
Kogan Page Publishers. 
[31]  Paavola, L. 2021. Exploring microfoundations of field-
level change-Essays on transformations in the retailing 
industries. 
[32] Emirbayer, M. 1997. Manifesto for a relational 
sociology. American Journal of Sociology, 103: 281-317. 
[33] Maguire, S., C. Hardy, T.B. Lawrence. 2004 
'Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: 
HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. Academy of 
Management Journal, 47: 657-79. 
Page 7231
